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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
. T CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
\ ~) 
L ~· .. 
Charles Murray, Administrator, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
State of Ohio, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 312322 
Judge: Suster 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
Defendant, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County 
Prosecutor, and Marilyn B. Cassidy, Assistant Prosecutor, submit herewith the State's 
Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and 
Motion for a New Trial. The State of Ohio respectfully requests, for all of the reasons set 
forth in its brief, that Plaintiff's Motions be denied. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
Marilyn B. Cassidy (0014647) 
Assistant Prosecutor 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff has filed a motion alternatively seeking a Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict (JNOV) or New Trial. Plaintiff avers in his motion that this court erred in 
allowing this case to be heard by a jury and in admitting evidence that showed Dr. 
Samuel Sheppard was in a strained relationship with his wife. Furthermore, plaintiff 
alleges the jury was incapable of performing its function because it did not reach a 
verdict in plaintiffs favor and was unduly influenced by the State. 
Plaintiffs arguments are without legal foundation and amount to no more than a 
second-guessing of this court's prior rulings. As set forth below, the case was properly 
tried and a just conclusion reached. Plaintiff was afforded a full and fair opportunity to 
present its case. The jury rejected the claim based upon the evidence presented. Plaintiff 
is entitled to no more. Accordingly, the Motion for JNOV or New Trial should be 
summarily rejected. 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT CAN ONLY BE 
GRANTED WHERE REASONBLE MINDS CAN COME BUT TO ONE 
CONCLUSION, AND THAT CONCLUSION IS ADVERSE TO THE 
NONMOVING PARTY; WHERE REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE 
DIFFERENTLY, THE MOTION MUST BE DENIED 
" The test to be applied by the trial court in ruling on a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) is the same test applied on motion for directed 
verdict; evidence adduced at trial and facts established by admissions in pleadings and in 
record must be considered most strongly in favor of nonmovant, and if there is substantial 
evidence to support nonmovant's side of case, upon which reasonable minds might differ, 
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motion must be denied* * *." Davis v. Cincinnati, Inc. (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 116, 
(91h Dist.). See also Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp.(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 222; Airborne 
Express v. Sys. Research Laboratories, Inc. (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 498; White v. 
Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 39 (JNOV denied where evidence conflicts 
on a material issue). 
In ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court is not 
concerned with weight or credibility of witnesses. Davis, supra. The trial judge does not 
determine the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, and although he 
examines the materiality of the evidence, he does not look at the conclusions to be drawn. 
Cardinal v. Family Foot Care Centers, Inc. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 181. 
The State of Ohio presented overwhelming evidence that Sam Sheppard 
committed the murder of his wife, Marilyn Sheppard. To specify only some of the 
evidence, there is the testimony of Sam Sheppard, Bay Village policeman Fred 
Drenkhan, Cleveland detectives Shottke, Gareau, and Pagel. Furthermore, Dr. Bailey, a 
friend of Marilyn and Sam Sheppard, testified that Mrs. Sheppard was furious upon 
learning of a l~tter sent to Dr. Sheppard by Miss Susan Hayes and threatened divorce 
shortly before her death. Coroner, Dr. Elizabeth Balraj testified to the blunt trauma 
injuries sustained by Marilyn Sheppard, autopsy protocol and cause of death. Experts 
Toby Wolson, Dr. Robert White, and Greg McCrary provided testimony analyzing blood 
spatter, lack of injuries to Dr. Sheppard, and crime classification as staged domestic 
homicide, respectively. Dr. Tom Holland, forensic anthropologist, testified that the blunt 
trauma injuries inflicted upon Mrs. Sheppard were in the nature oflow speed air or high 
speed automotive impact and that death occurred quickly. Dr. Philip Bouffard testified 
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-that the handwriting in a book authored by Sam Sheppard and the inscription "yes" below 
the text, "Did Sam do it?" was the writing of Sam Sheppard. 
There exists abundant, substantial, evidence in support of the theory that Sam 
Sheppard is not innocent of the murder of his wife, Marilyn Sheppard. Clearly, 
reasonable minds col!ld reach that conclusion. Thus, under Ohio Civil Rule 50 (B) and 
case authorities, plaintiffs motion JNOV must be denied. 
A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL MAY NOT BE GRANTED \VHERE THE 
VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL AND 
APPARENTLY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 
A motion for new trial upon the basis that the judgment is not sustained by 
sufficient evidence will not be granted where the verdict is supported by competent, 
substantial, and credible evidence. In Verbon v. Pennese (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 182, the 
court stated: 
"Where there is a motion for a new trial upon the ground 
that the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence, 
a duty devolves upon the trial court to review the 
evidence adduced during the trial and to itself pass upon 
the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence in 
general. It is true that, in the first instance, it is the 
function of the jury to weight the evidence, and the court 
may not usurp this function, but, when the court is 
considering a motion for a new trial upon the sufficiency 
of the evidence, it must then weigh the evidence. A court 
may not set aside a verdict upon the weight of the 
evidence upon a mere difference of opinion between the 
court and jury." Vernon, citing Paske v. Mergl (1959), 
169 Ohio St. 70 at 73,74. 
"In deciding whether to grant a new trial the judge has often been referred to as the 
thirteenth juror.* * * While this does not mean that the judge may substitute his own 
judgment for that of the trier of fact, it does require the judge to 'view the verdict in the 
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overall setting of the trial: * * *and abstain from interfering with the verdict unless it is 
quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result"'. Eagle Am. Ins. Co. v. 
Frencho (1996), 11 Ohio App.3d 213. 
"In a civil context, it is well established that where an appellant challenges a trial 
court's judgment in a civil action as being against the weight of the evidence, the function 
of the appellate court is limited to an examination of the record to determine ifthere is 
any competent, credible evidence to support the underlying judgment. If competent, 
credible evidence is present a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court's judgment. 
Doss v. Smith (June 25, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72672, unreported. See also, 
Zurowski v. Giannini (June 25, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No.72704, unreported. 
It is significant, also, that a jury is not required to give any additional weight to 
-.. the opinion of an expert, if any weight at all. Rather, an expert's opinion is admissible, as 
is any other testimony, to aid the trier of fact in arriving at a correct determination of the 
issues being litigated. Expert testimony is permitted to supplement the decision-making 
process of the 'fact-finder' not to supplant it. Ragone v. Vitali & Betrami, Jr. Inc. (1975), 
42 Ohio St.2d 161. 
"The jury system has its roots in our Constitutions, both federal and state, and is 
fundamental to our democratic form of government, therefore, a jury verdict cannot be 
set aside lightly by conclusory statements of the trial judge not grounded in the evidence 
* * * It is axiomatic that the trial court cannot simply substitute its opinion for that of a 
jury." Karnavas, et. al. v. Lakewood Hospital Association, et. al (March 15, 1997), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 70685, unreported. 
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There is ample evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict for 
defendant, State of Ohio. The fact that plaintiff disagrees with the jury's verdict is not 
grounds for a new trial. There is absolutely no evidence that the jury reached a clearly 
erroneous verdict. Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs position that the scientific evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that Sheppard could not have committed the murder of his 
wife, the jury is not required to give any weight to testimony presented by experts. In 
view of the foregoing, plaintiffs motion for a new trial should be denied. 
A SHORT PERIOD OF DELIBERATION BEFORE THE JURY REACHES 
VERDICT IS NOT GROUNDS FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
A short period of deliberation by a jury before retuning a verdict does not establish 
/ 
the proposition that the jury did not properly perform itsifuties * * * The short period 
of deliberation in such cases may indicate only that the members of the jury felt that the 
evidence was overwhelming in favor of the party receiving the verdict. Segars v. 
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company (1961), 286 F.2d 767 (motion for new trial 
denied, four minute jury deliberation). 
There is no prescribed length of time for which a jury must deliberate. In denying 
a motion for a new trial that alleged jury misconduct because the jury deliberated twenty-
one minutes before reaching a verdict, the Second District Court of Appeals opined: 
"There is no statutory provision prescribing the length of 
time a jury shall deliberate before reaching a verdict. 
While the verdict should be the result of sound judgment, 
dispassionate consideration, and conscientious reflection, 
and the jury should, if necessary, deliberate patiently and 
long on the issues which have been submitted to them, yet 
where the law does not positively prescribe the length of 
time a jury shall consider their verdict, they may render a 
valid verdict without retiring, or on very brief 
deliberation after retiring, although the trial court may in 
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its discretion cause the jury to reconsider the case if their 
decision is so hasty as to indicate a flippant disregard of 
their duties." Val Decker Packing Co. v. Treon (1950), 88 
Ohio App. 479. (emphasis added.) 
The amount of time a jury spends in deliberations is not indicative of its consideration of 
the evidence* * * [A] brief deliberation time does not suggest juror misconduct. State v. 
Lent (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 149, (forty minute guilty verdict, felonious assault 
charge). 
A unanimous verdict for the defendant in approximately two and a half hours 
demonstrates that the State's evidence was compelling, if not over-whelming. The jury 
in this case properly performed an extraordinary task. They spent ten weeks in Court 
Room 20 B, away from their jobs and families. They endured the same ten weeks of 
trial that the parties and the court endured, including numerous witnesses and volumes of 
exhibits. The jurors were attentive. The jurors took notes. Plaintiffs assertion that this 
jury failed to take seriously its role, or somehow, just didn't "get it" after a ten week 
digestive process offends the dignity of not just the individual jurors and the jury as a 
panel, but of counsel and the court as well. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ALIUNDE OF JUROR MISCONDUCT, NOR 
WAS THERE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT; PLAINTIFF HAS PROVED 
NO PREJUDICE AND THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL MUST BE DENIED. 
A. Juror Misconduct 
In cases involving outside influences on jurors, trial courts are granted broad 
discretion in dealing with the contact and determining whether to declare a mistrial or to 
replace an affected juror. State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72. Additionally, Ohio 
courts have a long-standing rule "not to reverse a judgment because of the misconduct of 
a juror unless prejudice to the complaining party is shown." [citations omitted.] "[J]uror 
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-misconduct must materially affect * * * substantial rights to justify a new trial * * * . 
[A] party complaining about juror misconduct must prove prejudice." Id. In State v. 
Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, a criminal defendant was denied a new trial where, 
after the verdict, counsel learned that a juror admitted contacting a psychologist for a 
definition of "para~oid schizophrenic." The trial court determined that appellant suffered 
no harm or prejudice as a result of the juror's brief conversation with the psychologist. 
"A court may determine that a juror's impartiality has remained unaffected based upon 
that juror's testimony. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945, 71 L.Ed.2d at 
85." Id. at 233. 
Plaintiff cites juror number 2' s request to be excused early in the trial, and one 
juror's report to the court of another juror's expression that she may have formed an 
opinion before the case was submitted. In each instance, the court fully and fairly 
investigated the situation. In the first instance, the juror in question was excused. In the 
second, the court voir dired the panel relative to the comment made by a juror. The court 
in its discretion determined that the jurors' impartiality remained unaffected, and that no 
prejudice was suffered by plaintiff. Each case of alleged misconduct was addressed 
properly by the court and no new trial should be granted on that basis. 
Plaintiffs reference to "undue influence" and jury misconduct does not extend 
factually beyond the two incidents discussed above. It is significant, however, that after 
entry of verdict, a charge of jury misconduct may not arise solely on juror's statement 
after deliberations, but instead, there must be some competent, credible evidence aliunde, 
that is, extraneous, independent evidence from some other source. Crawford v. Sylvania 
Marketplace Co. (1995), 72 Ohio Misc.2d 3, See also Tasin v. Sifco Industries, Inc. 
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(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 102; Evid. R. 606 (B). The aliunde principle protects the privacy 
of a jury's deliberations from inquiry and promotes the finality of jury verdicts. State v. 
Mason, supra, at 167. 
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
~ounsel is generally afforded wide latitude in addressing the jury during opening 
statements and closing arguments. State v. Lent (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 140, State v. 
Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239. Failure of counsel to object to the alleged 
misconduct during trial constitutes a waiver of any error associated with the alleged 
misconduct. Jones v. Olcese (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 34, (new trial denied where 
counsel's remarks supported by evidence). "Except where counsel, in his opening 
statement and closing argument to the jury, grossly and persistently abuses his privilege, 
the trial court is not required to intervene sua sponte to admonish counsel and take 
curative action ... Unless the record clearly demonstrates that counsel's argument was 
highly improper and inflamed the jury, [the]* * *court will not disturb the exercise of 
the trial court's discretion. Even where the remarks are found to be improper, there must 
be clear evidence that the jury's verdict is the product of passion and prejudice. "Jones, 
supra, [citations omitted.] 
Plaintiff makes scattered references to prosecutorial misconduct through out his 
brief. The principle bases for plaintiffs position seem to be that the prosecutor made 
reference to evidence of Sam Sheppard's extramarital affair(s) and identified instances 
which illustrate Sheppard's utter disrespect for Mrs. Marilyn Sheppard. In addition 
plaintiff argues that remarks made by Prosecutor Mason to the media concerning 
settlement amount to "undue influence." 
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With regard to the question of marital strain as motive, the parties fully briefed 
and argued those evidentiary issues to the court . As a result, the court allowed the State 
of Ohio to present certain evidence relative to marital strain. It is completely proper for 
the prosecutor to comment on that evidence as a part of his closing statement. 
The prosecutor's remarks were firmly rooted in the evidence presented to the jury., 
The term "playboy of the western world" originated from witness Mims Adler, a close 
friend of the Sheppards', not with the prosecutor. The jury heard from Susan Hayes, who 
testified to having had a sexual affair with Dr. Sheppard. In addition, Dr. Bailey testified 
that Mrs. Sheppard was emotional, angry, and threatened divorce when speaking to him 
and Mrs. Bailey at a birthday party. This information came from witnesses, not from the 
prosecutor. Inasmuch as the prosecutor's remarks are well grounded in the evidence, the 
remarks are proper, and no new trial should be granted. 
Prosecutor Mason's remarks to the media concerning a settlement offer were not 
improper and do not form a basis for a new trial. There was no gag order issued by the 
court. Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR7-107(C) provides that "a 
lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to 
protect a client from undue prejudicial effect ofrecent publicity not initiated by the 
lawyer or the lawyer's client. At the time Prosecutor Mason made a public statement 
concerning settlement negotiations, he was in complete compliance with DR 7-107. 
Moreover, he was obligated to respond to the inaccuracies promulgated by Mr. Gilbert to 
protect the interest of his client, the People of the State of Ohio. Finally, the court fully 
investigated by speaking with jurors and, within the court's discretion determined that no 
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-juror's impartiality had been affected. Accordingly, there are no grounds for a new trial 
on the basis of Mr. Mason's public remarks relative to settlement. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO 
TRIAL BY JURY IS CORRECT, AND EVEN IF INCORRECT IS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO PLAINTIFF AND IS NOT GROUNDS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL , 
A trial court may grant a new trial when it finds that it committed an error of law 
during the trial. Civ.R.59(A)(9). However, the trial court does not exercise discretion in 
making such a ruling. Consequently, the appellate court will reverse the new trial order 
when the challenged action was not error or was not prejudicial. Sanders et al. v. Mt. 
Sinai Hospital, et al. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 249. Where a new trial is granted by a trial 
court for reasons which involve no exercise of discretion, but only a decision as to a 
question of law, the order granting a new trial may be reversed on the basis of a showing 
that the decision was erroneous as a matter of law. Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio 
St.2d 82. In order to merit a new trial, appellant has the burden to demonstrate prejudice. 
Malloy v. City of Cleveland (Mar. 4, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 73789, unreported. See 
also, Flint v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., et al. (June 30, 1999), Portage App. No. 
97-P-0166, unreported. 
Article 1, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in 
actions existing at common law before the Ohio Constitution was enacted. False 
imprisonment was a tort at common law. With regard to wrongful imprisonment, R.C. 
2743.02 and R.C. 2743.48 and relevant case law provide that the state waived its 
immunity from liability and consented to be sued in accordance with the same rules of 
law applicable to suits between private parties. See Smith v. Wait (1975), 46 Ohio 
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App.2d 281, 283. The Ohio Supreme Court has specifically stated that "R.C. 2743.48 
does not replace the false imprisonment tort, but, rather, supplements it to allow a 
recovery in some cases where recovery was not available before." Bennett v. Ohio Dept. 
of Rehab & Corr. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 111. 
The parties fully briefed this issue for the court. Upon consideration of the briefs, 
the court granted defendant a trial by jury and set forth its basis in an opinion dated 
August 17, 1999. Even assuming the court is incorrect in its legal reasoning, it is difficult 
to imagine how a panel of eight jurors is prejudicial to plaintiff. Finally, the issue is 
preserved in the record for appellate review and does not constitute grounds for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial, competent, and credible evidence to support the jury's 
verdict for the State of Ohio. In light of all of the foregoing facts and principles of law, 
defendant respectfully requests that plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and motion for a new trial be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
arilyn B. Cassidy (001 
Assistant Prosecutor 




-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing State's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New Trial, 
was mailed via ordinary US mail to Terry Gilbert, Counsel for Plaintiff, 1370 Ontario 
Stre~t, Suite 1700, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, this 8 day of May, 2000. 
L~lA 
L. Christopher Frey V 
Assistant Prosecutor 
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